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Abstract: Recent interest in making and materiality spans from the humanities and social sciences to 
engineering, science, and design. Here, we consider making through the lens of a unique computational 
theory of design: shape grammars. We propose a computational theory of making based on the 
improvisational, perception and action approach of shape grammars and the shape algebras that support 
them. We modify algebras for the materials (basic elements) of shapes to define algebras for the materials 
of objects, or things. Then we adapt shape grammars for computing shapes to making grammars for 
computing things. We give examples of making grammars and their algebras. We conclude by reframing 
designing and making in light of our computational theory of making. 
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The recent wave of interest in making, materiality, and material culture – the so-called “material turn” and 
“new materialism” (Coole & Frost, 2010; Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012) – in the social sciences and 
humanities has been paralleled by growing attention and research on new materials, making, and 
manufacturing processes in engineering, science, and design. While humanists and social scientists 
inquire into the subjective, embodied, situated relationships between people and material things, their 
engineer, scientist, and designer colleagues tend to focus on technological innovations and applications of 
advanced materials and fabrication devices. 
 
We pursue a different tack in the terrain of making and material things. We consider making from a 
computational point of view. Our computational view intersects with some concerns above, but offers a 
distinct alternative to how we can think about and engage in making. Our view is rooted in computation – 
but computation beyond the narrow, digital kind of computation to a more general and perceptual kind in 
which people carry out operations with things that may only have digital approximations. In a similar 
vein, we consider making to be processes carried out by people to form material things. From this 
perspective, the kinds of making are extensive and diverse – ranging from drawing a picture on paper, to 
producing an image on a computer screen, to weaving a basket, to 3D printing a model, to machining 
engine parts, to constructing a building.  
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In developing our computational approach to making, we also consider the relationship between making 
and designing, the latter often understood as an intellectual or cognitive activity resulting in a plan for 
action or making. Our approach collapses many of the dualisms associated with designing and making 
that originate with Aristotle’s concept of hylomorphism. Hylomorphism regards creation as the imposition 
of an idea of form (morphe) upon passive material or matter (hyle). A reincarnation of hylomorphism, 
perhaps better known to architects, is Alberti’s distinction between designing – as a “pre-ordering of the 
lines and angles conceived in the mind” (Alberti, 1986: p 2) – and building. The anthropologist Tim 
Ingold and others have argued persuasively to overturn hylomorphic thinking and replace it with an 
outlook that foregrounds material processes of formation, as opposed to final products as materializations 
of preconceived ideas (Ingold, 2010: p 92). Our computational approach promotes this outlook. 
 
Specifically, we look at making through the lens of a unique computational theory: shape grammars. 
Since their introduction over forty years ago (Stiny & Gips, 1972), shape grammars have been identified 
with computational design. Within the field of computational design – beginning with its early origins in 
computer-aided design (CAD) up to the present day – research has focused on design and designing, as 
the field’s name implies. Accordingly, considerable research has centered on what is taken to exist in, or 
issue from, the mind or the intellect, as in studies of “design thinking”, “design reasoning”, and “design 
cognition”.  Many of the more influential studies along these lines have been presented within the pages 
of this journal, and the important core ideas have been brought together very neatly in a recent book by 
this journal’s editor-in-chief, Nigel Cross (2011). Shape grammar studies, on the other hand, have tended 
to focus on designs and their dynamic, perceptual properties, with less speculation about the thought 
processes behind their production. Shape grammars have provided a compelling alternative and 
overlapping theory to the many theories and tools, cognition-oriented or otherwise, within the field of 
computational design. Here, we propose that shape grammars also offer a natural basis for a 
computational theory of making.  
 
First, we review shape grammars and the shape algebras that support their improvisational, perception and 
action approach to computing. Second, we propose a definition of making that follows from the shape 
grammar approach and is also aligned with contemporary theories of making as they have been 
articulated in the social sciences, humanities, and elsewhere. Third, we show how shape grammars can be 
adapted, through our definition of making, to what we call making grammars. Specifically, we modify 
algebras for the materials – or stuff – of shapes (points, lines, planes, solids) to define algebras for the 
stuff of things, and we extend the idea of grammars for shapes to grammars for things. Fourth, we give 
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some examples of making grammars and their algebras. And last, we revisit design and designing in 
relation to our computational theory of making. 
 
1. Shape grammars 
 
Shape grammars are rule-based systems for describing and generating designs (Knight, 1999; Stiny, 
2006). Shape grammars are distinctive for their visual approach. They generate designs by computing 
directly with shapes in two or three dimensions, rather than with symbols, words, numbers, or other 
abstract structures that represent visual shapes indirectly. Over the years, shape grammars have been 
developed to tackle a continuum of design tasks from analysis to synthesis. They have been applied 
successfully in these tasks across virtually all areas of design from urban design to architecture to 
landscape design to craft to painting to product design to mechanical design. For examples in each of 
these areas, see, respectively: Beirão (2012), Duarte (2005), Stiny & Mitchell (1980), Muslimin (2010), 
Knight (1989), McCormack, Cagan & Vogel (2004), and Agarwal, Cagan & Stiny (2000). 
 
The rules of a shape grammar have the general form: A ® B where A and B are shapes and the arrow ® 
denotes “replace with”. A rule says: Look for the shape A, or a copy of it, in an existing shape S. The 
copy of A might be some spatial transformation of A (for example, a rotated, reflected, shifted, or scaled 
copy). If you can see the shape A or its copy, then subtract it from S and replace it with the shape B, or a 
copy of B using the same spatial transformation as for the copy of A. The result of applying the rule, that 
is, replacing A with B in the shape S, is the creation a new shape S¢. Rules are typically conceived or 
described in terms of the changes they effect when they are applied – for example, moving a shape, 
adding a shape, dividing a shape, erasing a shape, and so on. The formal replacement operation (® ) is a 
general operation which subsumes all these possibilities.  
 
When the rules of a shape grammar are applied recursively, beginning with an initial shape, a sequence of 
shapes called a computation is produced. A computation has the form:  S0 Þ S1 Þ S2 Þ … , Sn, where 
each Si  is a shape computed from the previous shape, beginning with the initial shape S0. The double 
arrow Þ represents the application of a rule. Shape grammars can be generalized to parametric shape 
grammars in which shapes in rules have parameters associated with them. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the visual rules of a shape grammar work. Each of the two rules shown take a 
shape – a square or an L-shape – and move it in space along a diagonal. Registration marks fix the before 
and after locations of the shapes. The rules can apply using different transformations or orientations 
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allowing for moves along a diagonal in different directions. Two example computations, each beginning 
with a double L-shape, reveal outstanding features of this shape grammar and shape grammars in general. 
The rules are nondeterministic and, importantly, can apply to emergent shapes, shapes that emerge from 
the application of rules. The two computations shown are identical up through the first four steps, at 
which point the rules are applied to different emergent shapes. Many other computations are possible. In 
other words, the shape computations here, and shape computations in general, are improvisational, 
perceptual, and action-oriented. In each step of a computation, the user can choose on the spot what 
shapes to see and what to do next.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A shape grammar and two possible shape computations. 
 
Shape grammars emulate what we do easily by hand with pencil and paper. Indeed, they can be developed 
and implemented entirely by hand (Figure 2). Implementation by machine is always possible, but often 
not straightforward. What is natural and easy to do with our eyes and hands – through seeing and doing 
(Stiny, 2006) – can be difficult to automate. But shape grammars are not without a rigorous formal 
foundation. Shape computations are underpinned by an algebraic theory that is a prerequisite to a general 
computer implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Experimenting with shape grammars with paper and pencil. 
 
rules 
®	
®	
computations 
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Briefly, an algebra is formally a set of entities that can be changed one into another by operations and 
transformations, and that can be ordered in terms of one or more relations. Algebras are defined for 
different basic elements – points, lines, planes, and solids (Stiny, 2006). Basic elements combine by 
adding them together in terms of a sum operation (+), or subtracting one from another in terms of a 
difference operation (-).  Spatial transformations (t) move basic elements around, reflect them, and change 
their size. Moreover, there is a part relation (≤) to show when one basic element is contained in another 
one. With the part relation, the operations of sum and difference, and the spatial transformations, the way 
rules work in shape computations can be described in detail. A rule A ® B applies to a shape S if there is 
a transformation t that makes A part of S, that is to say, t(A) ≤ S.  Then, the shape S¢ is defined in the 
formula S¢ = (S – t(A)) + t(B). All of this corresponds exactly to how rules work, as described informally 
earlier.       
 
2. Making  
 
Shape grammars foreground action and perception in designing. Designing with shape grammars is about 
doing (drawing) and seeing with basic spatial elements to make shapes. We extend this idea of designing 
to propose a definition of making: Making is Doing and Sensing with Stuff to make Things.1 This 
definition not only follows from shape grammar theory, but is also in the spirit of work in the social 
sciences, humanities, and elsewhere on the dynamic, embodied, improvisational, and material aspects of 
making. John Dewey in his landmark writings on aesthetics described art as a “process of doing or 
making” with “some physical material, the body or something outside the body, with or without the use of 
intervening tools, and with a view to production of something visible, audible, or tangible” (Dewey 1934: 
p 47). More recently, others have developed this idea, probing the various dimensions of making 
including materials (Ingold, 2007; Lehmann, 2015), skilled practice (Ingold, 2010), the body (Malafouris, 
2004), the senses (Howes, 2005), and more. 
 
The components of making proposed here – doing, sensing, stuff, things – are defined informally and are 
intended to be in keeping with our intuitive understandings of these terms. 
 
2.1. Doing and sensing 
 
Doing is an action – an action by a person or possibly by a machine. Doing includes actions like drawing, 
knotting, folding, typing, throwing, stomping, and so on. Sensing includes any one or more of our senses, 
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in any of the various ways our senses have been defined. It includes touching, hearing, seeing, feeling, 
tasting, and so on. (We take some liberties here with the idea of sensing, and assume that sensing extends 
to perception.) Both doing and sensing can be done with “tools”. Tools might be our bodies’ “tools” such 
as our hands or our eyes. For example, we can do (knot) with our hands and we can sense (see) with our 
eyes. Tools might also be extensions of our bodies, for example, pencils or eyeglasses. We can do (draw) 
with a pencil and we can sense (see) with eyeglasses. 
 
Doing and sensing are interrelated. Doing may involve sensing, and vice versa. The order and relations 
between the two, or between action and perception, have been a topic of much debate and research. Some 
of this work, for example Alva Noë’s (2004) compelling argument for the dependence of perception on 
action, might inform our future work. 
 
2.2. Stuff and things 
 
Stuff can be physical materials like gases, liquids, or solids (metal, fiber, plastic, wood, and so on) with 
properties that can be visual (color, texture, translucency, glossiness, and so on), acoustic, mechanical, 
geometric, and so on. A little more abstractly, stuff can be points, lines, planes, and solids. Stuff might be 
composed from other stuff. For example, watercolor paint is composed of pigment, binder, solvent, and 
other materials. In the abstract, stuff has indeterminate extent and parts. When used in making, stuff 
necessarily has determinate extent, but extent may or may not be appreciable or significant for the maker. 
 
Things are finite objects made of stuff. For example, shapes are things made of line stuff; knots are things 
made of string stuff; paintings are things are made of watercolor stuff (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Examples of things and the stuff with which they are made. 
 
2.3 Doing and sensing with stuff to make things 
 
When we make things with stuff, we usually engage multiple ways of doing and multiple modes of 
sensing. For the sake of simplicity, the examples we give in this paper focus on just one of the possible 
doings and just one of the possible sensings involved in the making of a thing. Following from the 
Things  Stuff 
shapes made with lines 
knots made with strings 
paintings made with watercolors 
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examples given in Table 1, Table 2 gives examples of doing and sensing with stuff to make things, 
showing one doing and one sensing for each example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Examples of doing and sensing with stuff to make things 
 
 
3. Making grammars 
 
Shape grammars for computing or making shapes can be adapted, through our definition of making, to 
making grammars for computing or making things – that is, as means for computational making. The 
algebras for the stuff of shapes (points, lines, planes, solids) can be modified to define algebras for the 
stuff of things. 
 
3.1. Algebras for stuff 
 
Algebras for the stuff of shapes are defined in terms of what we can draw and see with spatial stuff. 
Algebras for the stuff of things generalize this idea to encompass other kinds of doings and sensings with 
other kinds of stuff. Algebras for stuff formalize properties of materials that are relevant to artists, 
designers, or makers – properties that may be very different from those of interest to scientists or 
technologists. For example, materials scientists study the core physical properties of materials, going back 
to their atomic and electronic structure. These properties are critical for understanding and classifying 
materials and for discovering and creating new materials, but they are not necessarily useful to artists, 
designers, or makers. We do not need to know all the details about the physical attributes of materials in 
order to work with them. 
 
Studies of the sensory properties of materials, on the other hand, are more relevant to making but are few. 
Some studies are aimed at understanding how the sensory properties – the look, feel, taste, sound, smell, 
etc. – of materials are related to their physical properties. The “Sensoaesthetic Materials” project (n.d.) at 
the Institute of Making at the University College London is an excellent example. Work of this kind is 
leading to a much richer understanding of materials, but is of limited value in working with materials. 
Other sensory studies of materials focus on the user’s or consumer’s perception of the materiality of a 
Doing  Sensing  Stuff  Things 
drawing and seeing with lines to make shapes 
knotting and touching with strings to make knots 
painting and seeing with watercolors to make paintings 
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product or thing, not on the artist-designer-maker’s perceptions of the materials used in making the thing. 
(For example, see the discussion about the sensory attributes of products in Ashby and Johnson (2009: pp 
76-87).) In other words, the focus is on the sensory properties of a thing from a user’s point of view, not 
on the sensory properties of the materials from a maker’s point of view, in terms of what s/he can do with 
materials. Understanding users’ sensory impressions of a thing is a consideration in designing or making 
a thing, but it is not enough to tell us about how we sense and, importantly, what we can do with materials 
in making things. 
 
The physical (mechanical, thermal, electrical, and so on) properties of materials which are central to 
materials science, as well as the sensory properties discussed in product design, are typically represented 
through quantitative measurements and formulae. The doing and sensing properties of stuff that are 
central to making can be captured through algebras. These algebras may be thought of as phenomenal or 
alchemical. That is, our approach to algebras for stuff treats the sensing and doing properties of stuff as 
experiential properties, for example, as paint is described by the painter and philosopher Nigel 
Wentworth: 
… a physical description of paint might well be possible and interesting, but it will not 
capture the paint as the painter employs it. As with tools, paint is something that only is 
what it is through being used. In other words paint is paint. … To identify it and try to 
understand it in simple physical terms is to miss its very existence for what it is. … To 
understand it properly as paint we must locate it within the context in which it is paint, 
and that is within the practice of painting. (Wentworth, 2004: pp 34-35) 
 
Similarly, our approach to algebras for stuff treats the doing and sensing properties of stuff like 
substances in alchemy, for example, as described by Ingold in his reference to the art historian James 
Elkins’s discussion of painting: 
The world according to alchemy, as art historian James Elkins explains, was not one of matter 
that might be described in terms of its molecular composition, but one of substances that were 
known by what they look and feel like, and by following what happens to them as they are mixed, 
heated or cooled. Alchemy, writes Elkins, ‘is the old science of struggling with materials, and not 
quite understanding what is happening’ (Elkins 2000: 19). His point is that this, too, is what 
painters have always done. Their knowledge was also of substances, and these were often little 
different from those of the alchemical laboratory. As practitioners, the builder, the gardener, the 
cook, the alchemist and the painter are not so much imposing form on matter as bringing 
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together diverse materials and combining or redirecting their flow in the anticipation of what 
might emerge (Ingold, 2011: p 213). 
 
3.2 Grammars for things 
 
With algebras for stuff as foundation, we adapt shape grammars for computing shapes to making 
grammars for computing things.  
 
Like shape grammars, making grammars have rules of the form A ® B.  A and B are things, and the 
arrow ® is a formal replacement operation. In terms of making, though, the arrow ® stands for some 
doing and/or sensing. A doing results in a physical or perceptible change in a thing. A sensing results in a 
change in the sensing of a thing. As mentioned earlier, doing and sensing are interrelated and one might 
involve the other. The replacement operation ( ® ) is a general operation which subsumes all kinds of 
doings and sensings, whether simultaneous or independent. 
 
Also like the rules of a shape grammar, the rules of a making grammar can apply under different 
transformations. Depending on the things computed, the transformations might be the same as the spatial 
transformations used for shape grammars (p. x) or they might be other kinds of transformations particular 
to the things computed. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only spatial transformations in the 
examples here. 
 
The rules of a making grammar apply in the expected way to define a computation:  T0 Þ T1 Þ T2 Þ … , 
Tn. Each Ti  is a thing computed from the previous thing, beginning with the initial thing T0. The double 
arrow Þ represents the application of a rule. In terms of making, the double arrow represents a particular 
doing and/or sensing to make a thing Ti into a thing Ti+1.   
 
Making is a continuous, time-based process. A computation may be time-based, but it is not continuous. 
It segments a making process into parts marked by discrete moments. Each Ti  is a thing in a moment – a 
critical moment, a rest moment, or otherwise – in a making process. It is the outcome of a chunk of the 
process. The times in between moments can be broken up into finer and finer parts, but some parts may 
not be describable and only individually enacted. The design researcher Mads Jensen has described the 
challenges of analyzing and representing a person’s skilled movement through time: moments of rest can 
be identified, but equal weight must be given to the movements in-between these moments and to the 
continuity of the overall process (2009). Here, a computation according to the rules of a making grammar 
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represents just one of many possible interpretations of a making process as a sequence of moments and 
the times in-between.  
 
4. Examples of making grammars 
 
We give three examples of making grammars to illustrate the possibilities and range of computational 
making, and to raise issues and questions for further work: drawing with lines (á la Stiny), knotting with 
string (á la Ingold), and painting with watercolors (á la Sargent). The first two examples are developed in 
some detail; the third is more of a proposal. Each example considers making with particular kind of stuff 
to make particular things using particular doings and sensings. Each example highlights the need for a 
specialized algebra that reflects the doing and sensing properties of some stuff. Each example also 
considers how the doings and sensings with particular stuff might be represented in rules and 
computations.  
 
4.1. Drawing with lines (á la Stiny) 
 
This first example demonstrates that shape grammar computations are a kind of computational making. 
As we have noted, shape grammars are usually discussed in terms of designing. However, as a means for 
synthesis, they are a highly sensory, action-oriented kind of computational making. This example recasts 
the shape grammar of Figure 1 as a making grammar. It includes: 
Things   shapes in 2D 
Stuff lines in 2D, represented in an algebra for lines. 
Doing  drawing (either drawing and erasing, or drawing with trace overlays)  
Sensing  seeing (grasping, focusing attention) with the eyes 
 
Figure 3 shows the making grammar. There are two sets of rules: seeing rules and drawing rules. The 
highlighted shapes in the rules are shapes that are the focus of seeing or “grasping” with the eyes. The 
seeing rules apply to focus sight on – to visually grasp – a shape. They do not otherwise alter the shape. 
Seeing rules are similar to identity rules (Stiny, 1996), but here seeing rules explicitly identify what is 
visually grasped. The drawing rules are like the rules in Figure 1. They each apply to move a visually 
grasped shape along a diagonal. The computation is a series of alternating seeing and drawing moves. The 
computation is sequential but is separated into two columns to distinguish doing from sensing. This 
example is a much-simplified representation of an actual drawing process. The rules could be extended to 
allow, for example, for switching visual attention between different shapes before a drawing move is 
implemented, or for finer drawing moves for individual lines or their segments. 
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Figure 3.  Making Grammar: Drawing with lines. 
 
4.2. Knotting with string (á la Ingold) 
 
Lines in a two-dimensional drawing space are now rendered as strings in a three-dimensional world. This 
example is inspired by the many affinities of lines with the sensory, improvisational, and emergent 
qualities of making with physical materials. It draws in part from the anthropologist Tim Ingold’s use of 
line as a rich metaphor for making and skilled practice, and more generally, for understanding the world 
(Ingold, 2007, 2013a). For Ingold, lines and weaving embody the processes of growth, becoming, and 
formation that are intrinsic to making. Making is “like weaving a pattern from ever unspooling threads 
that twist and loop around one another, growing all the while without ever reaching completion” (Ingold, 
2013b). And knotting is the means by which lines are held together in the making.  
 
The knotting grammar we propose here also ties nicely to khipu, the knotted strings made by the Incas as 
a physical recordkeeping and communication language. Figure 4 shows one of the approximately six 
hundred extant khipu. Khipu knots are of three types: a single overhand knot, a long (multiple overhand) 
knot, and a figure eight knot. These knots are repeated in various sequences along strings, and the strings 
see 
see 
see 
see 
see 
draw 
draw 
 
draw 
 
draw 
 
draw 
 
computation 
®	
®	
sensing rules: seeing 
®	
doing rules: drawing 
®	
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are hung from a primary cord. The precise meaning and syntax of khipu has been a source of speculation. 
Gary Urton, a leading researcher in the field, has proposed that khipu were an early, binary form of 
narrative writing (Urton, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Khipu © President and Fellows of Harvard College, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 
PM# 41-52-30/2938 (digital file# 96770002), DETAIL. 
 
Our knotting grammar is simple and general, and a step toward a grammar for khipu making. It generates 
single overhand knots and multiple overhand (long) knots along a string. An overhand knot is one of the 
most basic knot forms and is the starting point for a variety of more complex knots (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  A step in making an overhand knot.   
 
An overhand knot can be repeated within itself to form multiple overhand knots: double, triple, quadruple 
and so on (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Single and multiple overhand knots (shown before and after tightening the knot). 
 single                double                          triple                             quadruple 
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Overhand knots (single or multiple) can also be repeated in different locations along a string (Figure 7).  
In other words, iteration can occur at two levels: within a knot and along a string. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Repeated overhand knots on a string. From left to right: triple, single, single, single, triple knots. 
 
The knotting grammar encompasses both types of iteration. It includes: 
Things   knotted strings in 3D, represented with an algebra outlined below.  
Stuff strings 
Doing  knotting (looping, pulling, etc.) 
Sensing  touching (grasping, focusing attention, repositioning) with the hands 
 
Note that we focus here on the sense of touch alone to simplify the example, and to highlight grasping 
with the hands as opposed to grasping with the eyes as in the previous example. Knotting is a highly 
tactile activity, but may involve other senses apart from touch, in particular, seeing. However, with a little 
practice, it is easy to make these knots entirely by hand and touch without the use of sight.  
 
Figure 8 shows the knotting grammar. There are two sets of rules: knotting rules and touching or grasping 
rules. The brackets in both sets of rules indicate the locations of left and right hand grasps, using thumb 
and forefinger, along a string. The knotting rules apply to change the configuration of a string by looping 
and pulling the string in different ways to tie knots. The touching/grasping rules apply to change a grasp 
location along a string (rules A and B) or to change the position of a hand (rule C) from under a string to 
over a string. They do not change the configuration of the string. Rule 4* is both a knotting and grasping 
rule: it applies to pull a string through a loop while sliding or moving a grasp along the string. The labels 
0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the doing rules control the sequence in which these rules apply. Sensing rules can be 
applied at any time. All of the rules apply under the same geometric transformations as shape grammars, 
so that knots can be made in different orientations and directions. The grammar is a highly schematized 
version of an actual knotting process. The knotting rules capture natural stopping or stable points in a 
continuous tying process. 
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Figure 8.  Making Grammar: Knotting with string. 
 
As mentioned earlier, an algebra is a set of entities that can be changed into others or that can be related to 
one another. Just as the entities in the algebras for shape grammars are points, lines, planes, or solids, the 
entities in the algebra for string grammars should be strings, or something like them in terms of relevant 
properties. But intuitively, shape elements and strings are not quite the same. In particular, shape elements 
fuse in combination, whereas strings are independent in combination. Further, both shape elements and 
strings may have parts embedded in them, but shape elements can have parts embedded in them anywhere 
whereas the parts of strings are limited by knots and their locations. For example, two lines may combine 
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to make a single, longer line, but two strings in combination are still two separate strings. Moreover, any 
line corresponds to a part of any other line, whereas a string corresponds to a part of another string only 
when their knots match up exactly. Such differences between shape elements and strings motivate our 
definition for an algebra of strings.        
 
A little abstraction is useful for this purpose, keeping in mind the physical and tactile properties of strings. 
In the algebra, it is assumed that each string is a singleton set to recognize the independence of strings in 
combination. A string is a sequence sks . . . ks of segments s and knots k, where for n segments, there are 
always n-1 knots. Knots cannot be at the ends of strings without trailing segments. Otherwise, the knots 
would unravel. Moreover, segments may vary in length. A segment is an internal segment if there are 
knots at both of its endpoints. Otherwise the segment is an end segment. If a string contains at least one 
knot, then it has two end segments. Knots are indexed with integers to indicate the number of ties they 
contain – 1 is for a single knot, 2 for a double knot, and so on. The string sk1sk3sk1s has four segments 
divided by a single knot, a triple knot, and a single knot. A tying operation is defined in the algebra to add 
knots to segments of strings. If a double knot is tied in the third segment of the string sk1sk3sk1s, then the 
new string sk1sk3sk2sk1s is defined in the algebra. A string S is part of another string S¢ whenever the knots 
and the internal segments of S correspond exactly in a 1-1 relationship to knots and internal segments of 
S¢.  Internal segments must correspond in sequence and in length. The end segments of S must also be 
embedded in segments of S¢, where embedding is like the part relation for lines in shapes. Knots cannot 
be ignored in determining whether one string is a part of another string. If a knot is tied in a string, then 
the original string is not a part of the result. Two strings are equal if their segments and knots all 
correspond – each string is part of the other. Last, there are transformations in the algebra to change the 
length and location of strings, while preserving knots and the number of ties in them, and the relative 
lengths of segments. Knots are invariant under the transformations – just as, for example, labels are in 
shape grammars – while the lengths of segments can change. The transformations always apply to entire 
strings.   
 
Interpreting the rules in a knotting grammar in terms of this algebra is fairly straightforward. Essentially, 
the pieces of a string(s) in the left side of a rule must be included in a string(s) that is part of the string to 
which the rule applies. The use of transformations may be necessary for this purpose to obtain a string of 
the correct length. The result of applying a rule or a sequence of rules in the order given in the grammar is 
a knot corresponding to the tying operation in the algebra. 
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Note that the algebra can be extended to configurations of multiple strings located in either two 
dimensions or in three dimensions.  Formally, these configurations would be sets of singleton strings. It is 
also worth considering how the algebra might be extended to surfaces such a paper, where folds would 
correspond to knots.  An arrangement or array of areas and folds is one enticing possibility.         
 
A computation of a knotted string is shown in Figure 9. The computation is sequential, but separated into 
two columns to distinguish doing from sensing, as in Figure 3. Applications of the combined 
knotting/grasping rule 4* are shown in the middle. Unlike the previous example in Figure 3, this 
computation is not always a straightforward alternation between doing and sensing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Knotting a string with the grammar of Figure 8. 
computation 
doing (knotting) 
 
sensing (touching, regrasping) 
 
4* 
4* 
A, B 
B, 2, C, 3, 4*, A, 5  
1 
A 
5 
3 
C 
2 
A 
3 
C 
2 
B 
A, A 
1 
…	ß		
ß		…	ß		
ß		
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4.3. Painting with watercolors (á la Sargent) 
 
This last example is inspired by a recent exhibit at the Museum of Fine Arts Boston of the watercolor 
paintings of the American artist John Singer Sargent (Figure 10). This example is suggestive and 
speculative. We do not actually develop a grammar here, but use Sargent’s work to highlight the 
challenges of understanding and describing computationally a rich, complex making activity such as 
painting. Unlike the previous two examples, this example presents a making activity involving not just 
one but a multiplicity of materials or stuff that interact in complex and emergent ways. Relatedly and, 
also different from the previous examples, the making activity involves a multiplicity of doings, or 
actions, with various tools and techniques. A variety of sensings, such as seeing and touching, are also at 
play. 
 
 	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  John Singer Sargent, American, 1856–1925 La Biancheria, 1910. Translucent watercolor, with touches 
of opaque watercolor and wax resist, over graphite on paper. Sheet: 40.4 x 53.1 cm (15 7/8 x 20 7/8 in.)  Museum of 
Fine Arts, Boston  The Hayden Collection – Charles Henry Hayden Fund, 12.229. Photograph © 2015 Museum of 
Fine Arts, Boston. 
 
Sargent was a virtuoso of watercolor painting. His watercolors were done en plein air – on the spot 
paintings of people, things, and landscapes. He experimented with and exploited the potentials of 
materials in unprecedented ways, using different papers, different paints (watercolors and tempuras, dry 
and wet, thin washes and thick impasto), different additives to change a paint’s working and visual 
characteristics, graphite pencil, and wax. His tools were equally various – brushes, scrapers, sponges, and 
knives. And he deployed his tools through ingenious techniques, both additive and subtractive, to create 
unexpected texture, color, and lighting effects. (See Manick and Owen (2013: pp. 205-223) for a 
discussion of Sargent’s materials and techniques.) The historian Richard Ormond describes Sargent’s 
working methods: 
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Sargent used every trick in the book to achieve his effects in watercolor, sponging wet washes into 
one another, leaving the white of the paper bare for lights, sweeping wash over wax resist to create 
variegated surface textures, scratching out with knife and brush end to accentuate detail, and 
finishing things off with thick strokes of gouache and Chinese white for highlights. His style of 
technical virtuosity left little room for correction. He had the skill and confidence to paint at speed, 
improvising like a musical performer as he went along (Ormand, 2013: p. 23). 
 
A making grammar for Sargent’s watercolor painting would comprise: 
Things   watercolor paintings 
Stuff  various paint materials, each material represented with an appropriate algebra 
Doing painting, with various implements  
Sensing seeing (grasping, focusing attention) with the eyes, touching 
 
The challenges in developing a grammar to characterize Sargent’s highly skilled practice and expertise – 
even in part – are many. The stuff, the doings, and the sensings are complex, variable, and interrelated. 
Multiple different materials with different behaviors and properties interact with one another in different 
ways, in different sequences, and with different tools and techniques.  
 
Each different material might require a different algebra, and these may need to be combined in an 
algebra for entities of various kinds. Interactions between different algebras (for instance, the effects of a 
wet wash on wax) would need to be considered. Moreover, interactions would need to include the order in 
which materials are used (for example, a color wash applied over wax versus wax applied over a color 
wash). Material properties may not follow the usual mathematical axioms for algebras such as 
associativity, commutativity, and so on. Indeed, there seems to be no guarantee that materials are even 
invariant under transformations. But these complications, and no doubt many more, add to the excitement 
of Sargent’s methods and work.    
 
Doing rules would be equally complex as they involve actions with different outcomes depending on the 
tools involved, the materials used, and the materials to which they are applied. The specific action 
underlying an arrow ® in a doing rule A ® B  might need to be characterized anew. Indeed, replacement 
as in shape rules may no longer be sufficient. 
 
Another unique aspect of Sargent’s painting activity, and painting in general, is time. Some materials used 
in painting change over time with no direct action by the maker, changing the overall results. Colors that 
are glossy may become matte, for example. Material changes may or may not be premeditated by the 
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maker. Here is a description of how Sargent used the element of time in a calculated way – note the 
phrase in parentheses at the end: 
Some of these strokes [of opaque watercolor] have an unusual speckled appearance that allows the 
color of the underlying paint layer to show through gaps in the pigment. He achieved this mottled 
effect by vigorously churning opaque watercolor with a dry brush until the paint got frothy and 
then dragging his brush across the paper (when the air bubbles dried, they created the gaps) 
(Sherry, 2013: p. 182). 
 
Time can be incorporated into a grammar in a relatively straightforward way by defining a timed 
grammar. (See Saeedloei and Gupta (2010) for related work on timed automata.) In a timed grammar, a 
clock or timer is associated with the initial shape and rules. Time is defined through labels that function 
similarly to state labels in a shape grammar. A clock is set to time 0 for the initial shape and the start of a 
computation. When a computation begins, the clock starts. The clock time appears in each step of a 
computation. Any rule of the grammar that is dependent on time has a time label associated with its left 
and right sides. Not all rules need be time dependent or have time labels. A material element X in a 
painting (for example, air bubbles) that changes into a new material element Y (for example, gaps) after 
some interval i of time could be represented by a rule  X ® Y, where  X  has a time label  t  associated 
with it and  Y  has a time label  t+i  associated with it. Time rules could be included as doing rules in a 
making grammar, perhaps distinguished as passive doing rules in contrast to active doing rules. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
The approach we have taken to making involves algebras, and grammars with rules defined in terms of 
these algebras. The idea is to capture the salient properties of stuff and things in actual making, so that 
manipulating stuff and things can be described as computation. This has the advantage of clarity and 
precision in describing stuff and things, and in describing the making process itself.  It always helps to try 
and understand a process, no matter how natural it may seem. Moreover, our approach may suggest new 
avenues – unexpected computations – for making that may not be obvious simply by the use of traditional 
methods of making that are tried and true.   
 
Making shapes, making knots, making watercolors, as we describe them here, are all comparable, creative 
activities. But where does designing come in? We propose that shapes, knots, and watercolors are not 
designed, but made. Indeed, we would like to reframe the notion of designing – computational or 
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otherwise. We view designing not as an intellectual activity in which we can script in advance what we do 
and what can happen, but as a kind of making itself, an activity that demands perceptual, bodily 
engagements with materials in the world. Computation does not make designing any less a kind of 
making. Shape grammars have for long taken this point of view and, in so doing, stand apart from other 
computational design approaches. Here, we begin to show how the shape grammar perspective can be 
advanced in new directions for making.   
 
Note 
The uses of the terms “stuff” for material and “thing” for an object are commonplace. However, our 
immediate inspiration for using the two terms in conjunction comes from the subtitle “Things and Stuff” 
in the introduction of Edward Adelson’s paper (2001) on the perception of materials.  
 
References 
 
Adelson, E. H. (2001) On Seeing Stuff: The Perception of Materials by Humans and Machines. In B. E. 
Rogowitz & T. N. Pappas (Eds.), Proceedings of the SPIE 4299, Human Vision and Electronic 
Imaging VI, 1-12. 
Agarwal, M., Cagan J. & Stiny, G. (2000). A micro language: generating MEMS resonators by using a 
coupled form - function shape grammar. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 27(4), 
615-626. 
Ashby, M., & Johnson, K. (2009). Materials and Design: The Art and Science of Material Selection in 
Product Design Second Edition. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Beirão, J. N. (2012). CityMaker: Designing Grammars for Urban Design. PhD Dissertation. Delft, The 
Netherlands: Faculty of Architecture, Delft University of Technology.  
Coole, D. & Frost, S. (Eds.). (2010). New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
Cross, N. (2011). Design Thinking. Oxford: Berg. 
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as Experience. New York: Capricorn Books. 
Dolphijn, R. & van der Tuin, I. (2012). New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Open Humanities Press. 
Duarte J. P. (2005). Towards mass customization of housing: the grammar of Siza’s houses at 
Malagueira. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 32: 347- 380.    
Elkins, J. (2000). What Painting Is. NY & London: Routledge. 
Howes, D. (Ed.). (2005). Empire of the Senses: the Sensual Culture Reader. Oxford: Berg.  
Ingold, T. (2007). Lines: A Brief History. Abington, UK & New York: Routledge. 
Ingold, T. (2007). Materials against materiality. Archaeological Dialogues 14, 1-16. 
Ingold, T. (2010). The Textility of Making. Cambridge Journal of Economics 34, 91–102. 
Ingold, T. (2011). Being Alive: Essays on movement, knowledge and description. NY & London: 
Routledge. 
Ingold, T. (2013a). Making. NY & London: Routledge. 
Ingold, T. (2013b). Of blocks and knots. Architectural Review 234, issue 1400, 26-27. 
Jensen, M. V. (2005). An Anthropological Move Towards Tangible Interaction Design. Nordic Design 
Research 1 (http://www.nordes.org/opj/index.php/n13/article/view/250/233). 
Knight, T. W. (1989). Transformations of De Stijl art: the paintings of Georges Vantongerloo and Fritz 
Glarner. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 16(1), 51-98. 
	 21 
Knight, T. (1999). Shape Grammars in Education and Practice: History and Prospects. International 
Journal of Design Computing 2, 
http://faculty.arch.usyd.edu.au/kcdc/ijdc/vol02/papers/knightFrameset.htm. 
Knight, T. & Stiny, G. (2001). Classical and Non-classical Computation. Architectural Research 
Quarterly 5(4), 335-372. 
Lehmann, A-S. (2015). The Matter of the Medium. Some Tools for an Art Theoretical Interpretation of 
Materials. In C. Anderson, A. Dunlop, & P. H. Smith (Eds.), The Matter of Art: Materials, 
Technologies, Meanings 1200-1700 (pp. 21-41). Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Manick, A. & Owen, A. (2013). Bringing Back Something Fine. In E. E. Hirschler & T.A Carbone (Eds.), 
John Singer Sargent Watercolors (pp. 205-223). Museum of Fine Arts Boston and Brooklyn 
Museum. 
Malafouris, L. (2004). The cognitive basis of material engagement: Where brain, body and culture 
conflate. In E. DeMarrais, C. Gosden, & C. Renfrew (Eds.), Rethinking Materiality: The 
Engagement of Mind with the Material World (pp. 53–62). Cambridge: McDonald Institute 
Monographs.  
McCormack, J. P., Cagan, J. & Vogel, C. M. (2004). Speaking the Buick language: capturing, 
understanding and exploring brand identity with shape grammars. Design Studies 25(1), 1-29.  
Muslimin, R. (2010). Interweaving Grammar: Reconfiguring Vernacular Structure Through Parametric 
Shape Grammar. International Journal of Architectural Computing 8 (2), 93-110. 
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Ormand, R. (2013). Sargent and Watercolor. In John Singer Sargent Watercolors (pp. 15-25). Museum of 
Fine Arts Boston and Brooklyn Museum. 
Preston, B. (2013). A Philosophy of Material Culture: Action, Function, and Mind. NY & London: 
Routledge, pp. 30-32. 
Saeedloei, N. & Gupta, G. (2010).Timed Definite Clause w-Grammars. Technical Communications of the 
International Conference on Logic Programming (Edinburgh), 212-221. 
“Sensoaesthetic Materials”. Institute of Making at the University College London. Retrieved from 
http://www.instituteofmaking.org.uk/research/sensoaesthetic-materials 
Sherry, K. A. (2013). Approaching the Modern. In John Singer Sargent Watercolors (pp. 181-183). 
Museum of Fine Arts Boston and Brooklyn Museum. 
Stiny, G. (1996). Useless Rules. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 23(2), 235-237. 
Stiny, G. (2006). Shape: Talking About Seeing and Doing. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Stiny, G. & Gips, J. (1972). Shape Grammars and the Generative Specification of Painting and Sculpture. 
Information Processing 71, 1460-1465. 
Stiny, G. & Mitchell, W. J. (1980). The grammar of paradise: on the generation of Mughul  
gardens. Environment and Planning B 7, 209-226.  
Urton, G. (2003). Signs of the Inka Khipu: Binary Coding in the Andean Knotted-String Records. Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press. 
Wentworth, N. (2004). The Phenomenology of Painting. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
